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Abstract
Although customers frequently negotiate the prices of both goods and services, academic research has mostly examined nego-
tiations in goods contexts, neglecting the fact that negotiations for services may be different. This study examines the conse-
quences of customers’ price negotiation behavior relating to services as compared to goods. Using five empirical studies with
field and experimental data, the authors show that services exert ambivalent effects. First, the heterogeneity intrinsic to services
leads customers to aspire to better negotiation outcomes because customers perceive higher risk and regard negotiation as more
legitimate, particularly if services are customized. Second, the inseparability of services leads customers to lower their negoti-
ation aspirations because they fear negative consequences, particularly if customers are closely integrated in the service process.
Building on these findings, the authors conceptualize and test communication strategies that diminish customers’ negotiation
aspirations. Study results provide actionable recommendations for managers and salespeople in service industries.
Keywords Price negotiations . Personal selling . Goods versus services . Heterogeneity . Inseparability
Price negotiations between customers and salespeople are
common, with almost half of U.S. consumers negotiating for
a better deal on everyday offerings (Consumer Reports 2013).
These negotiations pertain to both goods, such as appliances,
furniture, and electronics, and services, such as telecommuni-
cation services, bank services, and medical services
(Consumer Reports 2013; Sharma and Krishnan 2001). In
fact, in customer price negotiations, no product category
seems to be off limits (Sundem 2010; White 2012).
Academic literature has generated a large body of knowledge
on drivers of customer–salespeople negotiation outcomes and on
the effectiveness of various negotiation behaviors (e.g., Sharma
and Krishnan 2001; Wieseke et al. 2014). Most prior studies
have examined negotiations about goods, such as cars or houses
(e.g., Pruitt and Syna 1985; White and Neale 1994), or, in
business-to-business contexts, industrial plants, raw materials,
or electronic equipment (e.g., Carnevale and Isen 1986;
Galinsky andMussweiler 2001). Only a few studies have exam-
ined negotiations about services—that is, “deeds, processes, and
performances provided, coproduced, or cocreated by one entity
or person for and/or with another entity or person” (Zeithaml
et al. 2017, p. 4). The limited studies in this area have considered
negotiations about a catering service contract (Kopelman et al.
2006) or, in a business-to-business context, an information tech-
nology service contract (Adam and Shirako 2013). Some studies
have also examined price negotiations for goods–services bun-
dles (e.g., Thompson and Hastie 1990; Van Kleef et al. 2004).
Surprisingly, to the best of our knowledge, no study has ex-
amined whether and how price negotiations differ for services
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and goods. We consider this omission to be striking for two
reasons. First, the answer to the question of whether and how
negotiations about services and goods vary is not intuitive be-
cause different theoretical lenses may predict countervailing ef-
fects. On the one hand, owing to the potentially increased het-
erogeneity in the quality of services (e.g., Zeithaml et al. 1985),
customers could negotiate harder because they perceive negoti-
ating as more legitimate and aim to reduce their financial risk
(e.g., Murray and Schlacter 1990). This approach could result in
lower negotiated prices (e.g., Hüffmeier et al. 2014). On the other
hand, customers could negotiate more softly in a service context
to avoid alienating the service provider and risking erosion of
service quality. As a result, negotiated prices could even be
higher (e.g., Hüffmeier et al. 2014). In summary, how negotia-
tions differ for services compared to goods is not easily
discerned, rendering the issue intriguing for academic research
(e.g., Gabbott and Hogg 1994; Murray and Schlacter 1990).
Second, knowledge of how services and goods negotia-
tions differ is of paramount managerial importance, particu-
larly for managers in the surging service sector. Specifically,
building on an in-depth understanding of the mechanisms
governing services negotiations, practitioners could use
targeted strategies that help them enforce prices for service
offerings. This approach could alleviate practitioners’ concern
that salespeople grant discounts too easily (Joseph 2001) and
enable them to reach one of their top performance metrics:
avoiding discounting (CSO Insights 2014).
Because the impact of services versus goods on price negoti-
ations is not intuitive and is of high relevance for practice, we
comprehensively examine this impact theoretically and empirical-
ly. We build our conceptualization by integrating aspiration level
theory (Siegel and Fouraker 1960) with the IHIP framework
representing intangibility, heterogeneity, inseparability, and per-
ishability (Zeithaml et al. 1985). Specifically, we expect that
two customer inferences will result from the heterogeneity inher-
ent in services, as service quality may differ depending on time,
customer, and producer (Zeithaml et al. 1985). First, we expect
customers to infer negotiation legitimacy, defined as the extent to
which customers perceive negotiating as customary (e.g., Jang
and Chu 2012; Varman and Costa 2008). Second, we expect
customers to infer product risk, defined as the extent to which
customers anticipate unpleasant consequences from purchasing
an offering (Bauer 1960). These inferences should raise cus-
tomers’ negotiation aspirations, or the extent to which customers
aim to achieve discounts in price negotiations with salespeople,
and thus reduce negotiated prices. Further, we expect this effect to
be particularly evident for highly customized services, or offerings
that are individually tailored to customers (Gwinner et al. 2005).
Conversely, because services are produced and consumed
simultaneously, resulting in inseparability (Zeithaml et al.
1985), we expect customers to fear that hard negotiation may
damage the customer’s relationship to the service provider and
thereby reduce service quality. More formally, we expect that
inseparability evokes perceived negotiation risk, defined as a
customer’s concern that negotiating may result in lower service
quality. This concern may lead customers to develop lower ne-
gotiation aspirations, which should increase the negotiated price.
We hypothesize this effect to be particularly pronounced for
situations of high integration, defined as the extent to which
customers and service providers act as co-producers of services.
On the basis of these hypotheses, we conceptualize and empir-
ically test four managerial communication strategies—negotia-
tion illegitimacy framing, product security framing, negotiation
risk framing, and price transparency framing—which we ex-
pect to reduce customers’ negotiation aspirations when purchas-
ing services with high heterogeneity and low integration.
To test the hypotheses, we conducted five studies. These
comprise four experiments (Studies 1, 2, 3, and 5) and one
field survey (Study 4), covering almost 1,300 customers (Web
Appendix W1.1 gives an overview). We conducted a pre-
survey to determine the prevalence of negotiations for services
and situated all of our studies in industries in which price
negotiations are moderately prevalent or highly prevalent
(Web Appendix W1.2).
Our study contributes to academic research in three ways.
First, by integrating aspiration level theory with the IHIP
framework, our work provides detailed insights into the am-
bivalent effects of services (compared to goods) in price ne-
gotiations. While customers’ increase in negotiation aspira-
tions owing to a service’s heterogeneity may not be particu-
larly surprising, our finding of a negative effect owing to a
service’s inseparability is an intriguing addition to prior liter-
ature. Second, our work has key implications for future nego-
tiation research, as our study reveals that, contingent on the
specific characteristics of services (e.g., level of customization
and integration), negotiations for services may differ substan-
tially from negotiations for goods. Third, our study conceptu-
alizes and empirically verifies four novel communication
strategies that successfully reduce customers’ negotiation as-
pirations, extending the literature on influence tactics in price
negotiations (e.g., Bhatia and Gunia 2018; Malhotra and
Bazerman 2008). Importantly, managers and salespeople can
use these communication strategies to improve price enforce-
ment. For example, by emphasizing that maintaining a good
customer relationship is important, they may prevent cus-
tomers from developing excessive negotiation aspirations.
Theoretical background
To conceptualize the effect of services versus goods on price
negotiations, we integrate two well established theories: aspi-
ration level theory (Siegel and Fouraker 1960) and the IHIP
framework (Zeithaml et al. 1985). We illustrate the integration
of these theories in Fig. 1, anchor it in prior literature in
Table 1, and elaborate in the following discussion.
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Aspiration level theory (Siegel and Fouraker 1960) pro-
poses that an individual enters a negotiation hoping to achieve
a certain goal. This goal is a crucial driver of the individual’s
negotiation behavior and success (Thompson 1995), as an
individual with a high aspiration level is likely to make high
demands in a negotiation, which signals unwillingness to
yield to the opposing party (Hüffmeier et al. 2014; Siegel
and Fouraker 1960). As a result, the other party is more likely
to concede, which improves the focal individual’s economic
outcomes (Hüffmeier et al. 2014). Thus, “it pays to be tough”
(MacMurray and Lawler 1986, p. 35).
Prior literature has established that the level of aspiration
differs across negotiators, resulting from factors such as per-
sonality, needs, and interpersonal perceptions (e.g., Barry and
Friedman 1998; Hüffmeier et al. 2014; Jap et al. 2011).
Building on the notion that aspirations form contextually, we
propose that customers adjust their aspirations when negotiat-
ing about services as opposed to goods. We deduce this prop-
osition by integrating aspiration level theory with the IHIP
framework (Zeithaml et al. 1985). Offerings ranking high
among the IHIP characteristics tend to be classified as ser-
vices, and offerings ranking low on these are understood as
goods (e.g., Edgett and Parkinson 1993; Zeithaml et al. 1985).
We expect two of the characteristics to integrate with aspira-
tion level theory to form countervailing effects (see Fig. 1).
First, the heterogeneity of services may lead customers to
increase their negotiation aspirations because they perceive
negotiating to be more legitimate (e.g., Huppertz et al. 1978)
and attempt to reduce their elevated product risk perception
(e.g., Weber and Hsee 1998). We expect this effect to be par-
ticularly pronounced for highly customized services. Second,
we argue that services’ inseparability leads customers to
lower their negotiation aspirations because they perceive ne-
gotiating itself as risky (e.g., Amanatullah et al. 2008). We
expect this effect to be particularly pronounced if customers
are highly integrated in the service delivery.
We empirically test our corresponding hypotheses in five
studies. We first derive and empirically verify the mediating
effects linking services and customers’ negotiation aspira-
tions. We then derive and empirically verify the moderating
effects of customization and integration. Finally, we hypothe-
size which communication strategies service providers might
use to lower their customers’ negotiation aspirations.
Hypotheses (Part 1): Mediating effects
The mediating effect of heterogeneity in services
negotiations
Services are heterogeneous in the sense that their quality typ-
ically differs depending on time, customer, and producer (e.g.,
Aspiration Level Theory
(Siegel and Fouraker 1960)
IHIP Framework
(Zeithaml, Parasuraman, and Berry 1985)
a Inspired by Darke and Dahl (2003); Huppertz, Arenson, and Evans (1978); Maxwell, Nye, and Maxwell (1999); Xia, Monroe, and Cox (2004).
b Inspired by Grewal et al. (2007); Mitchell and McGoldrick (1996); Roth and Rothblum (1982); Weber and Hsee (1998).
c Inspired by Amanatullah, Morris, and Curhan (2008); Grewal, Gotlieb, and Marmorstein (2000); Greenhalgh and Chapman (1998); Greenhalgh and Gilkey (1993); Wieseke, Alavi, and Habel (2014).
1
Included in Study 1 (N=150). Key result: Heterogeneity and inseparability constitute mediators.
2
Included in Study 2 (N=188). Key result: Negotiation legitimacy, product risk, and negotiation risk constitute mediators.
3
Included in Study 3 (N=448). Key result: Customization and integration constitute moderators.
4
Included in Study 4 (N=198). Key result: Results of Study 3 exhibit external validity.
5
Included in Study 5 (N=307). Key result: Negotiation illegitimacy framing, price transparency framing, and negotiation risk framing constitute remedy strategies to alleviate a customer’s negotiation aspiration.
Strengthening the negative effect of 
inseparability on negotiation aspiration
Strengthening the positive effect of 
heterogeneity on negotiation aspiration
Service 
(versus Good)1,2,3,4
Customer’s 
Negotiation 
Aspiration1,2,3,4,5
Negotiated Price1,2,3,4
Heterogeneity1,2,5
Inseparability1,2,5
Customer’s Perceived 
Product Risk
b,2
Customer’s Perceived 
Negotiation Risk
c,2
Customer’s Perceived 
Negotiation 
Legitimacy
a,2
Customization3,4
Integration3,4
+
+
+
-
+
+
+ +
+
-
Salesperson’s 
Remedy Strategies5
-
Alleviating a customer’s negotiation 
aspiration for heterogeneous services 
with high customer integration
Integrating constructs:
+
Fig. 1 Conceptual framework integrating the IHIP framework and aspiration level theory
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Zeithaml et al. 1985). In contrast, the quality of goods tends to
be less contingent on these factors. For example, the quality of
a service such as a restaurant meal “can vary from producer to
producer, from customer to customer, and from day to day”
(Zeithaml et al. 1985, p. 34). Conversely, goods such as
canned foods purchased in a grocery store are more likely to
exhibit homogeneous quality with negligible variation be-
tween different purchases.
As previously noted, heterogeneity increases negotiation
aspirations. Customers may perceive negotiating over hetero-
geneous offerings as more legitimate than negotiating over
homogenous offerings, and may attempt to reduce product
risk concerning the quality of heterogeneous offerings.
Path via negotiation legitimacy Whether negotiating is per-
ceived as legitimate depends largely on the perceived
price fairness of an offering (Xia et al. 2004). Customers
perceive a price as fair if their benefits from the offering
meet or exceed their purchase costs (Xia et al. 2004;
Habel et al. 2016). However, services exhibit greater het-
erogeneity than goods, rendering a service’s quality and
benefits to customers uncertain (Edgett and Parkinson
1993). As a result, customers may perceive a service’s
price fairness as more uncertain as well (Bolton and
Alba 2006; Martín-Ruiz and Rondán-Cataluña 2008). In
light of such uncertainty, we argue that customers are
likely to perceive that an offering’s price is subject to
debate—that is, to perceive greater negotiation legitimacy
(e.g., Xia et al. 2004). As a result, customers may be more
likely to raise their negotiation aspirations (Siegel and
Fouraker 1960).
Path via product risk The second reason suggesting that the
heterogeneity of services increases customers’ negotiation as-
pirations pertains to customers’ attempt to reduce their product
risk. This proposition draws on perceived risk theory (Bauer
1960; Cox 1967; Cunningham 1967), which holds that cus-
tomers’ perceived risk “is a product of the degree of uncer-
tainty and the extent of consequences that would result from a
wrong decision” (Mitchell and McGoldrick 1996, p. 3).
Perceived risk is particularly pronounced when purchasing a
service as opposed to a good, because a service’s heterogene-
ity renders service quality and thus customers’ benefits more
uncertain (e.g., Edgett and Parkinson 1993; Murray and
Schlacter 1990; Zeithaml et al. 1985).
When facing risky purchase decisions, customers strive to
reduce risk (Mitchell and McGoldrick 1996). One way to
lower risk is to negotiate down the price and alleviate potential
loss in case an offering turns out to exhibit low quality (e.g.,
Roth and Rothblum 1982). Thus, we argue that to mitigate the
increased risk resulting from a service’s heterogeneity, cus-
tomers who purchase services are likely to form elevated ne-
gotiation aspirations (e.g., Siegel and Fouraker 1960). Thus:
H1: Negotiations about services (in contrast to goods of com-
parable performance) increase customers’ negotiation as-
piration via services’ elevated heterogeneity.
H2: The positive effect of heterogeneity on customers’ nego-
tiation aspiration is mediated by customers’ perceived ne-
gotiation legitimacy.
H3: The positive effect of heterogeneity on customers’ nego-
tiation aspiration is mediated by customers’ perceived
product risk.
The mediating effect of inseparability in services
negotiations
Inseparability denotes that services are produced and con-
sumed simultaneously (e.g., Zeithaml et al. 1985). This simul-
taneity leads to direct provider–consumer contact (e.g.,
Murray and Schlacter 1990) and “makes it… impossible to
test a service before purchase” (Bowen 1990, p. 44). Put dif-
ferently, service providers initiate service production only
after customers and service providers have agreed on a price.
In contrast, goods are typically first produced and then pur-
chased and consumed (Zeithaml et al. 1985).
The sequence of negotiation and production poses an inter-
esting challenge to customers in negotiating services pricing:
when claiming deep discounts, customers may improve the
price they have to pay, but simultaneously risk damaging the
relationship with service providers (e.g., Lax and Sebenius
1986). Since the service is still to be produced, customers
may fear that such damaged relationships induce service pro-
viders to retaliate and expend less effort in the service process,
which may lower the service quality (Parasuraman et al.
1988). As a result, we expect customers to reduce their nego-
tiation aspiration for services. We hypothesize:
H4: Negotiations about services (in contrast to goods of com-
parable performance) decrease customers’ negotiation as-
piration via services' (see H1) elevated inseparability.
H5: The negative effect of inseparability on customers’ nego-
tiation aspiration is mediated by customers’ perceived ne-
gotiation risk.
Services also differ from goods in terms of intangibility and
perishability. Intangibility refers to services as processes that
“cannot be seen, felt, tasted, or touched before they are pur-
chased” (Edvardsson, Gustafsson, and Roos 2005, pp. 113-
114), and perishability states that, unlike goods, services can-
not be stored or put into an inventory (e.g., Zeithaml et al.
1985). We do not expect intangibility and perishability to me-
diate the effect of services on customers’ negotiation aspira-
tion because both are less directly related to customers’
J. of the Acad. Mark. Sci.
perceptions of service risk and quality as compared to hetero-
geneity and inseparability. However, we test for such potential
mediation effects in our first and second studies.
The effect of negotiation aspiration on negotiated
price
Negotiation aspirations lead to more persistent negotiation
behavior, thus improving a customer’s negotiation outcome
(Hüffmeier et al. 2014; Alavi et al. 2018; Wieseke et al.
2014). To replicate this well accepted finding, we hypothesize:
H6: The higher customers’ negotiation aspiration, the lower
the negotiated price.
Study 1: Establishing the effects via
heterogeneity and inseparability
Motivation
The goal of Study 1 was to examine the effects of services
versus goods on customers’ negotiation aspiration via hetero-
geneity (H1) and inseparability (H4) as well as the resulting
effect on negotiated price (H6). To achieve these goals, we ran
an online negotiation simulation.
Procedure
Testing the differential effects of services and goods on cus-
tomers’ negotiation aspirations requires manipulation of the
specific offering customers would negotiate about. A funda-
mental methodological difficulty is to exclusively manipulate
the product type (service versus good) without unintentionally
manipulating additional factors, such as the product category
or product performance. To cope with these difficulties, we
kept constant the object to be negotiated—a car—and manip-
ulated the pricing model of how this car was provided to
customers. More specifically, in the goods condition, partici-
pants were purchasing a car whereas in two alternative ser-
vices conditions, participants were either leasing the car or
entering a pay-per-use contract (e.g., Bagga et al. 2018).
Leasing and pay-per-use are two well established approaches
to servitize traditional goods offerings (Tukker 2004; Vargo
and Lusch 2004), and over 70% of customers negotiate the
price when purchasing these offerings (Web Appendix 1.2).
To avoid unintentional manipulation of product perfor-
mance, we kept constant the perceived benefits of the car as
well as the total costs and residual value. Specifically, we
informed participants that the car fully satisfied their needs
and that the total price to them (for either the upfront purchase
or all leasing rates combined or all pay-per-use rates com-
bined) amounted to $18,000. To verify that residual value is
comparable across the services and goods conditions, we in-
formed participants in both conditions that after ten years the
car has a value of zero and needs to be replaced. Web
Appendix W2.1 provides the detailed treatments.
We used Mechanical Turk to acquire 150 participants (54%
male; mean age, 34.01 years), which were randomly divided into
three groups (good: purchase versus service: leasing versus ser-
vice: pay-per-use) with a between-subjects design. After reading
the scenario, participants were asked whether they intended to
negotiate. Those who replied affirmatively entered a price nego-
tiation and were asked to provide their initial counter-offer.
Following established procedures in price negotiation re-
search, the computer assumed the salesperson’s role in the price
negotiations (e.g., Maxwell et al. 1999; Sinaceur et al. 2011; Van
Kleef et al. 2004). We used the formula (Z-(Y-X)*0.6) for the
calculation of the computer’s counter-offer (Balakrishnan and
Eliashberg 1995; Maxwell et al. 1999). For example, in the third
round of negotiation (t = 3), Z is equal to the computer’s offer in t
= 2 (thus, in the first round Z amounts to 18,000), Y corresponds
to the customer’s offer in t = 3, and X is equal to the customer’s
offer in t = 2. Put differently, “when the buyer [makes] a price
concession the computer [makes] a concession 60% as large”
(Maxwell et al. 1999, p. 554). Since in the first round of negoti-
ation (t = 0) X is not available, we defined X with the formula
(Y-(18,000-Y)*0.6) for the first round.
One round of negotiation ended after the customer submit-
ted an offer and the computer showed a counter-offer. The
participant could then accept the counter-offer, submit a new
offer, or abort the negotiation. In turn, the computer accepted
the customer’s offer when it was higher or equal to the next
offer the computer would make. If no agreement was reached
by the sixth negotiation round, the computer aborted the ne-
gotiation. This approach ensured that participants did not ne-
gotiate for an unrealistic amount of time, just to exhaust the
algorithm, for example.
Measures
Negotiation aspirationWe operationalized customers’ negoti-
ation aspiration as a participant’s requested discount in the
initial counter-offer (e.g., White and Neale 1994). For partic-
ipants who did not choose to negotiate, negotiation aspiration
was set to 0.
Negotiated price If a negotiation ended successfully, the cus-
tomers’ negotiated price equaled the agreed-upon price. If a
negotiation ended in an impasse, negotiated price attained a
missing value. For participants who chose not to negotiate,
negotiated price was set to the list price indicated in the
scenario.
Service versus good We operationalized the experimental
treatment using dummy variables with the goods group coded
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as 0 and the services group coded as 1. As we use two alter-
native manipulations of services—leasing and pay-per-use
pricing—we specified two dummy variables with the goods
group as the baseline condition (Aiken and West 1991).
IHIP dimensionsWe measured intangibility, heterogeneity, in-
separability, and perishability on seven-point scales.
Control variables To account for inter-individual predisposi-
tions to ask for discounts when interacting with salespeople,
we collected customers’ general negotiation propensity
(Schneider et al. 1999; Wieseke et al. 2014). In addition, to
account for differences in negotiation behavior related to the
product category, we controlled for participants’ negotiation
expectation (Oliver et al. 1994). The Appendix provides in-
formation on all survey scales and Web Appendix W2.2 pro-
vides detailed statistics on all experimental cells.
Results
Validity checksWe conducted five checks to verify the validity
of our manipulations. We verified that (1) our manipulations
worked as intended, (2) participants were comparable in all
conditions, (3) participants perceived the scenario as realistic,
(4) participants did not know the hypotheses of this study, and
(5) we did not unintentionally manipulate factors beyond the
offering type (such as product value). All checks supported
the validity of our experimental design (see Web Appendix
W2.3 for details).1
Main results To test our hypotheses, we specified a path model
in line with Fig. 1. That is, following the recommendation to
include experimental treatments in structural equation models
(Bagozzi 1977; MacKenzie 2001), we specified the effect of
our independent variables (i.e., the two dummies indicating
service versus good) on the four IHIP dimensions. We also
specified the effects of the IHIP dimensions on negotiation
aspiration and the effect of negotiation aspiration on negotiat-
ed price. Last, in line with common practice in mediation
analysis (Baron and Kenny 1986; Shrout and Bolger 2002),
we specified direct effects of the services versus goods
dummies on negotiation aspiration and negotiated price.
We estimated the path model using Mplus 7 (Muthén and
Muthén 2012). The results are provided in Table 2 (Model 1).
First, in line with H1 and H4, negotiation aspiration is affected
by heterogeneity (positively: β = .17, p < .10) and insepara-
bility (negatively: β = -.20, p < .10). To test our propositions
in that heterogeneity and inseparability mediate the effect of
services versus goods on negotiation aspiration, we estimated
the indirect effects by bootstrapping parameter estimates using
bias-corrected confidence intervals (CIs) and 500 repetitions
(MacKinnon et al. 2004). Such CIs are especially useful to
take potential non-normality of the parameter estimate distri-
bution into account. Results reveal that the indirect effect of
the services (leasing) versus goods condition on negotiation
aspiration via heterogeneity is significantly positive (unstan-
dardized estimate b = 1.68, p < .10, CI = 90%) and the indirect
effect via inseparability is significantly negative (b = -2.48, p
< .05, CI = 95%). This result is mirrored in the services (pay-
per-use) versus goods condition regarding the heterogeneity
indirect effect (b = 1.68, p < .05, CI = 95%) and the insepara-
bility indirect effect (b = -2.03, p < .10, CI = 90%). These
results provide first support for H1 and H4, suggesting that
services exhibit ambivalent effects on a customer’s negotia-
tion aspiration. These opposing effects cancel each other out
and result in a total null effect of services versus goods on
negotiation aspiration (btotal leasing = -.80, p > .10; btotal pay-
per-use = -.35, p > .10).
Second, in H6 we argued that a customer’s negotiation
aspiration lowers the negotiated price. The effect of negotia-
tion aspiration on negotiated price is significantly negative (β
= -.82, p < .01), confirming H6. Third, intangibility and per-
ishability do not emerge as mediators of the effect of services
versus goods on negotiation aspiration (p > .10).
Robustness checks We verified the robustness of our results in
twoways. First, we repeated our analysis without controlling for
a customer’s general negotiation propensity and negotiation ex-
pectation (Model 2 in Table 2). Results remained fully stable.
Second, we replicated our estimation of indirect effects using the
PROCESS macro (Hayes and Preacher 2014). Again, results
fully confirm our main analysis, suggesting that heterogeneity
positively mediates the effect of services versus goods on nego-
tiation aspiration (for leasing: βindirect = 2.93, CI90% lower = .23;
CI90% upper = 6.58; p < .10; for pay-per-use pricing: βindirect =
3.04, CI95% lower = .20; CI90% upper = 6.94; p < .05) and insep-
arability negatively mediates (for leasing:βindirect = -3.67, CI95%
lower = -7.80; CI95% upper = -.32; p < .95; for use-based pricing:
βindirect = -2.72, CI90% lower = -6.47; CI90% upper = -.12; p < .10).
Study 2: Elucidating customers’ inferences
from heterogeneity and inseparability
Motivation
Study 2 zooms in on the psychological mechanism linking het-
erogeneity and inseparability and customers’ negotiation aspira-
tion. We predict heterogeneity to increase customers’ negotia-
tion aspiration through elevated negotiation legitimacy (H2) and
product risk (H3), whereas we predict inseparability to reduce
negotiation aspiration through elevated negotiation risk (H5).
1 We conducted the same validity checks for our further experiments, Study 2
(see Web Appendix W3.3), Study 3 (see Web Appendix W4.5), and Study 5
(see Web Appendix W6.3).
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Procedure
We adopted an approach similar to that in Study 1. To manip-
ulate the offering type, in the goods condition we told partic-
ipants that they were purchasing a lawn mower, while in the
services condition we told participants they were interested in
purchasing a lawn mowing service contract. Customers often
negotiate for both lawn mowers (27.9%) and mowing services
(43.5%), rendering these offerings an adequate context for this
study (Web Appendix W1.2).
As in the previous study, to avoid unintentional manipula-
tion of product performance we kept constant the perceived
benefits of the offerings and the total costs and residual value.
We informed participants that the offer fully satisfied their
needs and that they paid the total price upfront. To verify that
residual value is comparable across the services and goods
conditions, we informed participants in both conditions that
after five years the offer has a value of zero and needs to be
replaced or expires (Web Appendix W3.1).
We used Mechanical Turk to acquire 188 participants for
the study (65.5% male; mean age, 32.6 years). The partici-
pants were randomly divided into two groups (service versus
good) with a between-subjects design. Participants first read
the scenario and then indicated whether they intended to ne-
gotiate about the offer, with those who confirmed providing
their initial counter-offer. The negotiation simulation followed
the same procedures as in Study 1.
Measures
We devised measures for this study closely in line with the
previous study (negotiation aspiration, negotiated price, IHIP,
the experimental service versus good treatment dummy with
good coded as 0 and service coded as 1, as well as control
Table 2 Study 1: Estimated path coefficients
Path Hypotheses Model 1:
Full Model
Model 2:
No Controls
Effects of services on IHIP dimensions
Good (0) versus service: leasing (1)→ intangibility .09n.s. .11n.s.
Good (0) versus service: leasing (1)→ heterogeneity .16† .17†
Good (0) versus service: leasing (1)→ inseparability .21* .21*
Good (0) versus service: leasing (1)→ perishability .21* .21*
Effects of services on IHIP dimensions
Good (0) versus service: pay-per-use (1)→ intangibility .10n.s. .11n.s.
Good (0) versus service: pay-per-use (1)→ heterogeneity .16† .17†
Good (0) versus service: pay-per-use (1)→ inseparability .16† .16†
Good (0) versus service: pay-per-use (1)→ perishability .15n.s. .15n.s.
Effects of IHIP dimensions on customers’ negotiation aspiration
Intangibility→ negotiation aspiration -.12n.s. -.04n.s.
Heterogeneity→ negotiation aspiration .17† .23**
Inseparability→ negotiation aspiration -.20† -.19†
Perishability→ negotiation aspiration -.00n.s. -.08n.s.
Effects of customers’ negotiation aspiration on customers’ negotiated price
Negotiation aspiration→ negotiated price H6: - -.82** -.82**
Controlled paths
Good (0) versus service: leasing (1)→ negotiation aspiration .03n.s. .04n.s.
Good (0) versus service: leasing (1)→ negotiated price -.00n.s. .00n.s.
Good (0) versus service: pay-per-use (1)→ negotiation aspiration .11n.s. .10n.s.
Good (0) versus service: pay-per-use (1)→ negotiated price .04n.s. .05n.s.
Effects of control variables
General negotiation propensity→ negotiation aspiration .16† —
Negotiation expectation→ negotiation aspiration .17† —
Negotiation expectation→ intangibility .23** —
Negotiation expectation→ heterogeneity .14† —
Model fit
Comparative fit index (CFI) .97 1.00
Root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) .10 .00
Standardized root mean square residual (SRMR) .05 .00
Bootstrapped Indirect Effects
Good (0) versus service: leasing (1)→ intangibility→ negotiation aspiration -.70n.s. -.23n.s.
Good (0) versus service: leasing (1)→ heterogeneity→ negotiation aspiration H1: + 1.68† 2.41†
Good (0) versus service: leasing (1)→ inseparability→ negotiation aspiration H4: - -2.48†† -2.34††
Good (0) versus service: leasing (1)→ perishability→ negotiation aspiration -.08n.s. -.96n.s.
Good (0) versus service: pay-per-use (1)→ intangibility→ negotiation aspiration -.75n.s. -.25n.s.
Good (0) versus service: pay-per-use (1)→ heterogeneity→ negotiation aspiration 1.68†† 2.43††
Good (0) versus service: pay-per-use (1)→ inseparability→ negotiation aspiration -2.03† -1.92†
Good (0) versus service: pay-per-use (1)→ perishability→ negotiation aspiration -.06n.s. -.71n.s.
n.s. p > .10, † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01 (two-tailed); standardized coefficients. For the indirect effects unstandardized coefficients are reported and †† =
95% confidence interval (CI), † = 90% (CI). We dropped controlled effects of negotiation expectation on negotiated price, inseparability, and perish-
ability because they emerged as insignificant. For the same reason, we dropped the controlled effect of general negotiation propensity on negotiated price.
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variables). For the new constructs in this study—customers’
product and negotiation risk perceptions and negotiation
legitimacy—we adopted measures from prior research and
adjusted them if necessary. The Appendix provides informa-
tion on all survey scales and Web Appendix W3.2 provides
detailed statistics on all experimental cells. Web Appendix
W3.3 provides validity checks.
Results
To test our hypotheses, we specified a path model in line with
Fig. 1. That is, following the recommendation to include ex-
perimental treatments in structural equation models (Bagozzi
1977; MacKenzie 2001), we specified the effect of our inde-
pendent variables (i.e., the dummy indicating service versus
good) on the IHIP dimensions. We also specified the effects of
the IHIP dimensions on negotiation aspiration and the effect
of negotiation aspiration on negotiated price. Importantly, we
included customers’ perceived product risk, negotiation risk,
and negotiation legitimacy as mediators of the heterogeneity/
inseparability–negotiation aspiration linkage in the model.
Last, in line with common practice (Shrout and Bolger
2002), we specified direct effects of the service versus good
dummies on negotiation aspiration and negotiated price.
Using Mplus 7 (Muthén and Muthén 2012), we estimated
one model replicating Study 1 (Table 3, Model 1), and then
a model adding our focal mediators (Model 2). The model
exhibits a good fit (CFI = .95, SRMR = .04; RMSEA = .12).
Results are provided in Table 3.
We can replicate results of Study 1 for H1 and H4 because
services significantly increase heterogeneity and inseparabili-
ty, and negotiation aspiration is positively affected by hetero-
geneity (β = .20, p < .01) and negatively by inseparability (β =
-.16, p < .05; see Model 1).
Table 3 Study 2: Estimated path coefficients
Path Hypotheses Model 1:
Replication of Study 1
Model 2:
Full Model Study 2
Effects of services on IHIP dimensions
Good (0) versus service (1)→ intangibility .38** .38**
Good (0) versus service (1)→ heterogeneity .16* .16*
Good (0) versus service (1)→ inseparability .17* .17*
Good (0) versus service (1)→ perishability .28** .28**
Effects of IHIP on customers’ inferences
Heterogeneity→ negotiation legitimacy — .28**
Inseparability→ negotiation legitimacy — .13n.s.
Heterogeneity→ product risk — .23*
Inseparability→ product risk — .08n.s.
Inseparability→ negotiation risk — .19*
Heterogeneity→ negotiation risk — .26**
Effects of customers’ inferences on negotiation aspiration
Negotiation legitimacy→ negotiation aspiration — .33**
Product risk→ negotiation aspiration — .15*
Negotiation risk→ negotiation aspiration — -.14*
Effects of negotiation aspiration on negotiated price
Negotiation aspiration→ negotiated price H6: - -.86** -.84**
Controlled paths
Good (0) versus service (1)→ negotiation aspiration .12n.s. .10n.s.
Good (0) versus service (1)→ negotiated price .04n.s. .04n.s.
Intangibility→ negotiation aspiration -.13n.s. -.03n.s.
Intangibility→ negotiated price .02n.s. -.00n.s.
Heterogeneity→ negotiation aspiration .20* .08n.s.
Heterogeneity→ negotiated price .02n.s. .02n.s
Inseparability→ negotiation aspiration -.16* -.22**
Inseparability→ negotiated price .03n.s. .04n.s.
Perishability→ negotiation aspiration .08n.s. .08n.s.
Perishability→ negotiated price -.00n.s. -.01n.s.
Negotiation legitimacy→ negotiated price — -.06n.s.
Product risk→ negotiated price — .04n.s.
Negotiation risk→ negotiated price — .04n.s.
Model fit
Comparative fit index (CFI) 1.00 .95
Root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) .00 .12
Standardized root mean square residual (SRMR) .00 .04
Bootstrapped indirect effects
Good (0) versus service (1)→ heterogeneity→ negotiation legitimacy→ negotiation aspiration H2: + — 5.52††
Good (0) versus service (1)→ heterogeneity→ product risk→ negotiation aspiration H3: + — 2.11††
Good (0) versus service (1)→ inseparability→ negotiation risk→ negotiation aspiration H5: - — -1.59††
n.s. p > .10, † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01 (two-tailed); standardized coefficients. For the indirect effects unstandardized coefficients are reported and †† =
95% confidence interval (CI), † = 90% (CI). We dropped controlled effects of negotiation expectation and general negotiation propensity on negotiation
aspiration and negotiated price because they emerged as insignificant.
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To test our propositions in H2, H3 and H5 that negotiation
legitimacy, product risk, and negotiation risk mediate the ef-
fect of services versus goods on negotiation aspiration, we
included the respective mediators in the model (Fig. 1). To
test the mediation hypotheses, we estimated the specified
model including the mediators and control variables and then
calculated indirect effects by bootstrapping parameter esti-
mates and using bias-corrected confidence intervals and 500
repetitions (MacKinnon et al. 2004). Table 3, Model 2 gives
the individual path coefficients. Results reveal that the indirect
effect of services versus goods on negotiation aspiration via
heterogeneity and product risk is significantly positive (un-
standardized estimate b = 2.11, p < .05, CI = 95%) and the
indirect effect via heterogeneity and negotiation legitimacy is
significantly positive (b = 5.52, p < .05, CI = 95%). In con-
trast, the indirect effect of services versus goods on negotia-
tion aspiration via inseparability and negotiation risk is signif-
icantly negative (b = -1.59, p < .05, CI = 95%). The direct
effect of service versus good on negotiation aspiration is in-
significant (b = 35.64, p > .10). This finding provides support
for H2, H3, and H5, suggesting that services exhibit ambiva-
lent effects on a customer’s negotiation aspiration through
negotiation legitimacy, product risk, and negotiation risk. In
confirmation of H6, the effect of negotiation aspiration on
negotiated price is significantly negative (β = -.85, p < .01).
Intangibility and perishability do not emerge as mediators of
the effect of services versus goods on negotiation aspiration (p
> .10).
Robustness checksWe verified the robustness of our results in
two ways. First, we repeated our analysis without controlling
for a customer’s general negotiation propensity and negotia-
tion expectation (Model 2 in Table 3). Results remained fully
stable. Second, we replicated our estimation of indirect effects
using the PROCESS macro (Hayes and Preacher 2014).
Again, results confirm our main analysis, suggesting that het-
erogeneity positively mediates the effect of services versus
goods on negotiation aspiration via negotiation legitimacy
(βindirect = 6.08, CI95 lower = .65, CI95 upper = 15.06, p < .05)
as well as product risk (βindirect = 2.44, CI90 lower = .09, CI90
upper = 6.37, p < .10) and inseparability negatively mediates
via negotiation risk (βindirect = -1.65, CI90 lower = -4.40, CI90
upper = -.01, p < .10).
Hypotheses (Part 2): Moderating effects
The moderating effect of customization in services
negotiations
To provide further evidence of the theoretical mechanisms
proposed in H1–H5, we propose two moderators (customiza-
tion and integration) that should strengthen the hypothesized
effects of services compared to goods in price negotiations.
We first argue that customization elevates negotiation aspira-
tions for services compared to goods. Customization—the in-
dividual tailoring of offerings to customers (Gwinner et al.
2005)—increases uncertainty as to whether the offering can
succeed. For instance, providers may fail to understand cus-
tomers’ specific needs, to convert these needs into customized
specifications, or to produce the offering according to these
specifications (Gwinner et al. 2005; Parasuraman et al. 1988).
Thus, customers should expect that a customized service of-
fering’s quality depends on time, the customer, or the pro-
ducers’ skills—that is, customers may perceive higher hetero-
geneity (e.g., Zeithaml et al. 1985). Particularly for services,
heterogeneity may increase negotiation aspirations as cus-
tomers perceive negotiating as more legitimate and seek to
reduce their product risk (e.g., Xia et al. 2004; Weber and
Hsee 1998). Thus, customized service offerings should evoke
higher negotiation aspirations.
Notably, these effects should be particularly pronounced
for services compared to goods. Quality control is more diffi-
cult for services (Zeithaml et al. 1985), which should increase
the uncertainty as to whether customization efforts succeed.
Quality control is easier for goods because goods have more
observable attributes. In summary, we hypothesize:
H7: Customization has a more positive effect on customers’
negotiation aspiration for services as compared to goods.
The moderating effect of integration in services
negotiations
Services differ in the extent to which customers are integrated
in the service process. For example, while a fast-food restau-
rant requires little customer input, marriage counseling re-
quires customers’ co-creation of the outcome together with
the service providers (Bitner et al. 1997).
For two reasons, we expect that the more customers are in-
tegrated into the service process the less likely they are to in-
crease their negotiation aspirations. The first reason builds on
our derivation of H4 and H5. We argued that a service’s insep-
arability of production and consumption leads customers to de-
velop lower negotiation aspirations so as to not threaten the
service process and quality. We propose that customers are par-
ticularly likely to fear a decline of service quality if they are
heavily integrated in the service process, because the more cus-
tomers are integrated, the more service quality depends on the
collaboration of customers and service providers. Collaboration
crucially depends on the quality of the relationship between
customers and service providers (Payne et al. 2008). Thus, if
hard negotiations damage the relationship (e.g., Lax and
Sebenius 1986), service quality may be particularly at risk.
Second, customers who are integrated in a service may view
price negotiations as particularly inappropriate because they are
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co-producers of the service. In general, when customers enter
negotiations with a salesperson, they give reasons for their dis-
count claims and actively question whether the offering is worth
its price. However, when customers are heavily integrated in the
service and act as co-producers, argumentation and questioning
may seem inappropriate. That is, customers who are co-
producers of the service may feel as if, by negotiating, they
are questioning their own performance or abilities. Because ser-
vice customers actively strive to maintain a positive self-image
(Habel et al. 2017), we expect that highly integrated customers
will be more likely to refrain from price negotiations:
H8: Integration reduces customers’ negotiation aspiration to a
greater extent for services than for goods.
Study 3: Establishing moderating effects
of customization and integration
Motivation
In Study 3, we aim to fortify the essential role of heterogeneity
and inseparability by testing the moderating effects of
customization (H7) and integration (H8) in the service versus
good–negotiation aspiration relationship. Specifically, cus-
tomization should increase the heterogeneity of services and
enhance the positive effect of good (coded as zero) versus
service (coded as 1) on negotiation aspiration. Likewise, inte-
gration of customers in the service process should catalyze the
effect of a service’s inseparability and enhance the negative
effect of service versus good on negotiation aspiration.
Procedure
Study 3 comprises two separate 2×2 between-subjects nego-
tiation simulations (Study 3a and Study 3b). In both simula-
tions, the first treatment factor pertained to the offering type,
service versus good. The second treatment factor manipulated
customization to be low or high (in Study 3a) and integration
to be low or high (Study 3b). Using Mechanical Turk, we
randomly allocated 212 participants (63.3% male; mean age,
35.5 years) to Study 3a and 236 participants (58.5% male;
mean age, 33.1 years) to Study 3b.
As in the previous studies, we first asked participants to pic-
ture themselves in a purchasing situation and then enter a price
negotiation. To manipulate the experimental factors rigorously
and test our hypotheses in different contexts, we used different
scenarios for the two sub-studies. In Study 3a, we simulated the
purchase of a house. Participants considered buying either a
turnkey house or a construction company’s service of building
a house. For both offerings, over 80% of actual customers en-
gage in negotiations (Web Appendix 1.2), rendering this context
adequate for our study. To keep the performance and value of the
offerings constant, the two conditions indicated the same price
and informed participants that the house would fully satisfy their
needs. Tomanipulate customization, we told participants that the
house would be highly standardized (low customization) or
highly customized (high customization).
In Study 3b, we simulated the purchase of a real estate
security offering. Participants considered purchasing either
an alarm system (good) or a security service contract
(service) for their property at a price of $2,000. We again
constrained the performance of the offering to be constant
across the two product types: a properly secured property for
five years, after which the alarm system would have to be
replaced or the security service would expire. To manipulate
integration, we informed participants that the security system
would either run in the background without needing their in-
volvement (low integration) or require close coordination with
their dedicated involvement (high integration) (see Web
Appendices W4.1 and W4.2). After reading the scenario, par-
ticipants were asked whether they intended to negotiate about
the offer. Those who confirmed entered a price negotiation
and provided their initial counter-offer. For the price negotia-
tion process, we used the same algorithm as in Studies 1 and 2.
Afterwards, participants answered a set of survey questions.
Measures
We measured negotiation aspiration as participants’ initial
discount claim and negotiated price as the ultimate agreed-
upon price. Dummy variables indicating the treatment condi-
tions served as independent variables (i.e., service (1) versus
good (0), high (1) versus low (0) customization, and high (1)
versus low (0) integration). In addition, we surveyed partici-
pants’ general negotiation propensity and negotiation
expectation as control variables. The Appendix provides in-
formation on all survey scales andWeb AppendicesW4.3 and
W4.4 provide detailed statistics on all experimental cells. Web
Appendix W4.5 provides a set of validity checks.
Results
Study 3a tests H7, which predicts that customization positively
moderates the effect of service versus good on negotiation aspi-
ration. To test this hypothesis, we conducted an ANOVA and
inspected the mean values across the treatment conditions (Fig.
2). A two-way ANOVA with customers’ general negotiation
propensity and negotiation expectation as covariates revealed a
significant main effect of the services versus goods treatment
(F(1, 206) = 7.10, p < .01), an insignificant main effect of cus-
tomization (F(1, 206) = .11, p > .10) and, as hypothesized in H7,
a significant interaction effect of the treatment dummies on ne-
gotiation aspiration (F(1, 206) = 4.96, p < .05). Thus, H7 re-
ceives support. To verify that the pattern of the interaction effect
is as hypothesized, we inspected post hoc contrasts. As
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expected, for services, customers’ negotiation aspirations are
higher for high customization, though only marginally
(Mnegotiation aspiration, low customization = 12,524, Mnegotiation aspiration,
high customization = 21,452; ΔM = 8,928; F(1, 206) = 1.84, p <
.18). For goods, customers’ negotiation aspirations are lower for
high customization, though again only marginally (Mnegotiation
aspiration, low customization = 35,635 versus Mnegotiation aspiration, high
customization = 23,617;ΔM= -12,018; F(1, 206) = 3.20, p < .10).
However, as indicated by the significant two-way interaction
effect (F(1, 206) = 4.96, p < .05) and as hypothesized, custom-
ization increases negotiation aspirations for services to a signif-
icantly greater extent than for goods.
Study 3b tests H8, which predicts that integration negatively
moderates the effect of service versus good on negotiation aspi-
ration. A two-way ANOVAwith customers’ general negotiation
propensity and negotiation expectation as covariates revealed an
insignificant main effect of the services versus goods treatment
(F(1, 230) = 2.75, p > .05), a significant main effect of the
integration treatment (F(1, 230) = 5.84, p < .05), and important-
ly, a significant interaction effect of the treatment dummies on
negotiation aspiration (F(1, 230) = 4.19, p < .05) (Fig. 2). This
finding supports H8. Post hoc contrasts of this interaction effect
reveal that for services, integration significantly reduces negoti-
ation aspiration (Mnegotiation aspiration, low integration = 810 versus
Mnegotiation aspiration, high integration = 483;ΔM = -327; F(1, 230) =
10.15, p < .01) while for goods integration does not affect cus-
tomers’ negotiation aspirations (Mnegotiation aspiration, low integration
= 538 versusMaspiration, high integration = 511;ΔM= -27; F(1, 230)
= .07, p > .70). In both sub-studies, negotiation aspiration is
negatively correlated with negotiated price (rStudy 3a = -.84, p <
.01; rStudy 3b = -.85, p < .01), supporting H6.
Study 4: Establishing external validity
in the field and B2B context
Motivation
In Study 4, we aim to establish the external validity of our
previous findings. First, we test our propositions using cross-
industry field data. Second, as prior studies pertained to a
business-to-consumer context, we test the external validity
of our findings in a business-to-business context. To this
end, we conducted a field survey using a cross-industry sam-
ple of professional buyers.
Procedure
To collect field data, we developed an online questionnaire
targeting professional buyers from various industries. The ques-
tionnaire asked respondents to relate their survey answers to a
supplier that their own company was doing business with on a
regular basis and that they were able to evaluate. We asked the
professional buyers to indicate an offering they were purchasing
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from the supplier, assess the product type of the offering (service
versus good), and evaluate the degree of customization and
integration. In addition, respondents appraised their negotiation
aspiration as well as the price they generally realize for this
offering. Last, we collected a set of control variables. To collect
data, we purchased access to 200 professional buyers in the
United States through the online panel provider Survey
Sampling International (SSI) (62.1% male; mean age, 45.20
years; seeWebAppendixW5.1). As is commonwith such panel
data collections, a response rate is not available.
Measures
Negotiation aspirationAs our sample spans various industries
and products, we operationalized respondents’ negotiation as-
piration through three seven-point Likert items (“In price ne-
gotiations about this offering, we are very …hard / …tough /
…persistent”).
Negotiated price We asked participants what percentage dis-
count they typically realize on the list price of the offering
under consideration. We then subtracted this value from
100% to obtain a measure of negotiated price. Thus, in this
study we operationalized negotiated price relative to the list
price of an offering.
Service versus good We asked respondents what type of of-
fering they typically purchase from their supplier. We then
specified a service (1) versus good (0) dummy, similar to
our approach in our previous studies.
Customization and integration We measured customization
and integration of the focal offerings that the buyers purchased
on survey scales. A sample item of customization is “This of-
fering is individually developed for us” and a sample item of
integration is “Our business relationship with this firm is char-
acterized by close cooperation between the two companies.”
Control variables Given the cross-industry nature of our data,
we controlled for a number of potentially intervening factors:
competitive intensity, price performance, product satisfaction,
relationship length, company revenue, number of employees
in company, and professional experience. The Appendix pro-
vides all scales in detail. Web Appendix W5.1 provides de-
scriptive statistics and correlations.
Results
Main resultsWe specified a path model that included the effect
of the service versus good dummy on negotiation aspiration and
the effect of negotiation aspiration on negotiated price. As in
Study 3, we specified two interaction terms between the service
versus good dummy and customization as well as integration.
We included the effects of these interaction terms as well as the
main effects of customization and integration on negotiation
aspiration in our model specification. Last, we included the
effects of all control variables on both negotiation aspiration
and negotiated price. We estimated the path model using
Mplus 7 (Muthén and Muthén 2012). Owing to missing values
on all relevant variables, we dropped two observations, leaving
a final sample of 198. Results appear in Table 4 (Model 1) and
are described below. The model exhibits a good fit to the data
(χ2/df = 2.14; CFI = .90; RMSEA = .07; SRMR = .03).
Results reveal that the main effect of service versus good on
negotiation aspiration is insignificant (p > .10). However, its in-
teractive effect with customization on negotiation aspiration is
Table 4 Study 4: Estimated path coefficients
Path Hypotheses Model 1:
Full Model
Model 2:
No Controls
Main effects
Good (0) versus service (1)→ negotiation aspiration .02n.s. .06n.s.
Negotiation aspiration→ negotiated price H6: - -.15* -.20**
Good (0) versus service (1)→ negotiated price .03n.s. .01n.s.
Main effects of moderators
Customization→ negotiation aspiration .40** .44**
Integration→ negotiation aspiration -.15n.s. -.06n.s.
Interaction effects
Good (0) versus service (1) × customization→ negotiation aspiration H7: + .17* .18*
Good (0) versus service (1) × integration→ negotiation aspiration H8: - -.20* -.21*
Controlled effects
Competitive intensity→ negotiation aspiration .21** —
Company revenue→ negotiation aspiration .20** —
Company employees→ negotiated price -.14† —
Professional experience→ negotiated price .19** —
Model fit
R2 of negotiation aspiration .29** .22**
n.s. p > .10, † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01 (two-tailed); standardized coefficients. We dropped controlled effects of relationship length, product
satisfaction, price performance, company employees, and professional experience on negotiation aspiration, because they emerged as insignificant. For
the same reason, we dropped controlled effects of relationship length, product satisfaction, price performance, competitive intensity, and company
revenue on negotiated price.
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significantly positive (β = .17, p < .05) (Fig. 2). As expected,
customization has amore positive effect on negotiation aspiration
for services (β = .76, p < .01) as compared to goods (β = .40, p <
.01), supporting H7. In addition, the interactive effect of service
versus good and integration on negotiation aspiration is signifi-
cantly negative (β = -.20, p < .05). Integration exhibits a signif-
icantly more negative effect on negotiation aspiration for services
(β = -.53, p < .01) than for goods (β = -.15, p > .10), supporting
H8. Finally, the effect of negotiation aspiration on negotiated
price is significantly negative (β = -.15, p < .05), confirming H6.
Robustness checksWe conducted two supplemental analyses to
verify the robustness of our results. First, we repeated our esti-
mation without including control variables. Results appear in
Model 2 of Table 4 and are largely in line with Model 1,
supporting the results’ robustness. Second, our model employs
single-source data, which may give rise to common method
variance (Podsakoff et al. 2003). Web AppendixW5.2 describes
several precautions to rule out common method bias.
Hypotheses (Part 3): Communication
strategies
Our previous hypotheses propose that if a service exhibits high
heterogeneity and low integration,2 customers develop higher ne-
gotiation aspirations,which result in lower negotiated prices. From
the perspective of service providers, the question arises as to how
best to reduce customers’ negotiation aspirations so as to secure
price enforcement. We conceive four potential communication
strategies to improve price enforcementwhen selling serviceswith
high heterogeneity and low integration. These strategies build on
prior literature showing that customer perceptions in negotiations
can easily be mended through specific communication strategies
(Bhatia and Gunia 2018; Malhotra and Bazerman 2008).
Negotiation illegitimacy framing As we hypothesized earlier,
owing to a service’s heterogeneity, customers may infer ne-
gotiating to be particularly formatting and legitimate To
counteract this inference, salespeople might clarify that a ser-
vice is non-negotiable, shifting customers’ perceptions toward
the view that negotiating is illegitimate.
Price transparency framing We have argued that because of
their uncertainty regarding a service’s price fairness, customers
perceive negotiating over services as legitimate (Bolton andAlba
2006;Martín-Ruiz andRondán-Cataluña 2008). To increase per-
ceptions of price fairness and thus reduce negotiation legitimacy,
salespeople may give customers an overview of market prices
that clarifies that the requested price of a service is fair. With an
understanding of fair prices, customers may be less likely to
perceive negotiating as legitimate.
Product security framing Owing to a service’s heterogeneity,
customers may infer product risk and aspire to reduce their po-
tential loss (Roth and Rothblum 1982). To counteract this infer-
ence, salespeople might provide reassurance that they will satisfy
customers’ needs, thereby evoking perceptions of security rather
than risk.
Negotiation risk framing When customers are integrated in a
service process, they may infer that negotiating may impair the
customer–service provider relationship and result in reduced ser-
vice quality because a good relationship with service providers is
indispensable (Amanatullah et al. 2008). To foster this inference,
salespeople can emphasize the importance of good relationships
with customers in their specific context, potentially stimulating
customers’ motivation to preserve the relationship and thus re-
duce their negotiation aspirations. Thus:
H9: Negotiation illegitimacy framing reduces customers’ nego-
tiation aspiration for services with high heterogeneity and
low integration.
H10: Price transparency framing reduces customers’ negotiation
aspiration for services with high heterogeneity and low
integration.
H11: Product security framing reduces customers’ negotiation
aspiration for services with high heterogeneity and low
integration.
H12: Negotiation risk framing reduces customers’ negotiation
aspiration for services with high heterogeneity and low
integration.
Study 5: Testing effective salesperson
strategies for services negotiations
Motivation
Our previous studies indicated that services negotiations consti-
tute a double-edged sword. On the one hand, customers aspire to
higher negotiation outcomes owing to the heterogeneity of ser-
vices, which leads them to perceive negotiation legitimacy and
2 In this section, we focus on integration rather than inseparability for meth-
odological reasons. Specifically, to test the subsequent hypotheses, we aim to
manipulate a service to exhibit “unfavorable” characteristics that increase cus-
tomers’ negotiation aspiration and assess the impact of communication strat-
egies. However, the degree to which a service exhibits inseparability should be
decisively driven by the specific service category, which renders it difficult to
manipulate inseparability of a given service as high or low. Manipulating the
degree to which a customer is integrated in the service delivery is more feasi-
ble. Importantly, as suggested in H5 and H8, customers’ reasons for develop-
ing elevated negotiation aspirations for separable and non-integrated services
should be similar, that is, a decrease in perceived negotiation risk.
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product risk. On the other hand, customers have lower negotia-
tion aspirations owing to the inseparability of services—
particularly when they are integrated in the service process and
thus concerned about ramifications of negotiating. For manage-
rial practice, the question arises as to how employees may use
these findings to reduce customers’ aspirations in services nego-
tiations, thus improving suppliers’ price enforcement and profit-
ability. In this respect, H9–H12 proposed a set of communication
strategies, which Study 5 tests empirically.
Procedure
We acquired 307 participants from Mechanical Turk (56%
male; mean age, 34 years) and simulated the purchase of a
tax consultation service. As Web Appendix 1.2 shows, over
30% of actual customers engage in price negotiations when
purchasing such a service, providing sufficient variance for
studying customers’ negotiation behavior in this context.
We randomly assigned participants to six experimental
conditions. The first two conditions serve as control condi-
tions to evaluate the effectiveness of the communication strat-
egies. Specifically, as argued in H9–H12, our communication
strategies aim to reduce customers’ negotiation aspirations in
situations in which heterogeneity is high and integration is
low. Therefore, in our first experimental control condition
(“unfavorable IHIP”) we specified heterogeneity as high and
integration as low without including a communication strate-
gy. We expect our communication strategies to significantly
decrease negotiation aspiration compared to this first control
condition. To further evaluate the effectiveness of our com-
munication strategies, we added a second control condition
(“favorable IHIP”) with low heterogeneity and high integra-
tion, as our previous studies suggest this specification of het-
erogeneity and integration should lead to low negotiation as-
pirations. Thus, this control condition will allow us to evaluate
the extent to which our communication strategies decrease
negotiation aspirations.
To manipulate the tax consultant’s heterogeneity, we pro-
vided participants with one- to four-star evaluations from 100
prior customers. In the low heterogeneity condition, all prior
customers had given the tax consultant three stars whereas in
the high heterogeneity condition star ratings varied, yet also
resulted in an average three-star rating. To manipulate integra-
tion, we described the tax consultation process. In the low
integration condition, the tax consultant worked largely inde-
pendently from customers whereas in the high integration
condition, participants would be strongly involved in the ser-
vice delivery.
The third to sixth experimental conditions comprise unfa-
vorable IHIP to evoke high negotiation aspiration as well as
the tax consultant’s application of communication strategies as
laid out in H9—H12—that is, negotiation illegitimacy fram-
ing, price transparency framing, product security framing, and
negotiation risk framing. Web Appendix W6.1 provides the
detailed manipulations. After reading the scenario, partici-
pants stated whether they would ask for a discount. Those
who did entered their first price offer as in the previous stud-
ies. Given our previous studies’ strong evidence of the effect
of negotiation aspiration on negotiated price, we omitted the
negotiation simulation in this study. Thus, in Study 5 negoti-
ation aspiration is the ultimate outcome variable.
Measures
The operationalization of negotiation aspiration was the same
as that in the previous studies. For participants who did not ask
for a discount, negotiation aspiration was set to 0. For those
whomade a counter-offer, negotiation aspirationwas set to the
discount claimed. As in Studies 1, 2, and 3, we collected
customers’ general negotiation propensity and negotiation ex-
pectation as control variables. The Appendix provides infor-
mation on all survey scales, Web Appendix W6.2 provides
statistics on all experimental cells, and Web Appendix W6.3
provides validity checks.
Results
To test H9–H12, we inspected the mean value of negotiation
aspiration (Fig. 3). An initial single-factor ANOVA suggested
significant mean differences across the treatment conditions
(F(5, 301) = 2.42, p < .05).
Post hoc contrasts provided the following insights. First, as
expected, negotiation aspiration was higher in the first control
condition (unfavorable IHIP) than in the second control condi-
tion (favorable IHIP; Munfavorable IHIP = 128.31, Mfavorable IHIP =
87.22; F(1, 301) = 3.96, p < .05). This finding confirms our
previous results that customers aspire to higher price discounts
if heterogeneity is high and integration is low (H1 and H8).
Second, in H9 we suggested that framing a negotiation as
illegitimate reduces negotiation aspiration for services with
high heterogeneity and low integration. In line with this pre-
diction, negotiation aspiration in the negotiation illegitimacy
condition is significantly lower than in the unfavorable IHIP
control condition (Munfavorable IHIP = 128.31, Mnegotiation illegit-
imacy framing = 57.96; F(1, 301) = 11.24, p < .01) and not
statistically different from the favorable IHIP control condi-
tion (Mfavorable IHIP = 87.22, Mnegotiation illegitimacy framing =
57.96; F(1, 301) = 1.93, p > .10). Thus, H9 is supported.
H10 proposes that creating price transparency reduces ne-
gotiation aspiration for services with high heterogeneity and
low integration. Fully in line with this hypothesis, negotiation
aspiration in the price transparency framing condition is sig-
nificantly lower than in the unfavorable IHIP control condi-
tion (Munfavorable IHIP = 128.31, Mprice transparency framing =
81.68; F(1, 301) = 5.43, p < .05) and not statistically different
from the favorable IHIP control condition (Mfavorable IHIP =
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87.22, Mprice transparency framing = 81.68; F(1, 301) = .08, p >
.10). Thus, H10 is supported.
In H11 we proposed that product security framing reduces
negotiation aspiration for services with high heterogeneity and
low integration. Negotiation aspiration in the product security
framing condition is lower than in the unfavorable IHIP con-
trol condition, but the difference is not significant (Munfavorable
IHIP = 128.31, Mproduct security framing = 97.94; F(1, 301) = 2.18,
p > .10). Thus, H11 is rejected although the effect is
directionally consistent.
Eventually, in H12 we suggested that negotiation risk fram-
ing reduces negotiation aspiration for services with high het-
erogeneity and low integration. Corroborating this hypothesis,
negotiation aspiration in the negotiation risk framing condi-
tion is lower than in unfavorable IHIP control condition at
marginal significance (Munfavorable IHIP = 128.31, Mnegotiation
risk framing = 92.26; F(1, 301) = 3.08, p < .10) and not statisti-
cally different from the favorable IHIP control condition
(Mfavorable IHIP = 87.22, Mnegotiation risk framing = 92.26; F(1,
301) = .06, p > .10). Thus, H12 receives some support.
Robustness checks In line with Studies 1, 2, and 3, we repeat-
ed our analyses while controlling for general negotiation pro-
pensity and negotiation expectations. Results remained fully
stable, providing support that they are not unduly influenced
by omitted variable bias.
Discussion
Research issues
According to Herbst, Voeth, andMeister (2011, p. 976), “buy-
er–seller negotiations are an important, but still inadequately
treated aspect within marketing research.” One inadequately
treated aspect is the question of how price negotiations for
services and goods differ. Given the high theoretical and prac-
tical relevance of this question, we devised five studies to
explore the effect of services versus goods on a customer’s
negotiation aspiration and analyzed psychological mecha-
nisms and boundary conditions.
Our work contributes to academic knowledge in several
ways. First, the study’s unique contribution lies in the integra-
tion of two well established theoretical frameworks—the IHIP
framework (Zeithaml et al. 1985) and aspiration level theory
(Siegel and Fouraker 1960). Specifically, we develop a theo-
retical rationale and provide empirical evidence suggesting
that customers form negotiation aspirations on the basis of
an offering’s heterogeneity and inseparability. We hereby fill
the research void regarding whether and how services negoti-
ations differ from goods negotiations. Negotiation aspirations
rise because services tend to exhibit higher heterogeneity,
leading customers to perceive negotiation legitimacy and
product risk. Notably, this effect is consistently predicted by
128
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perceived risk theory (Bauer 1960; Cox 1967; Cunningham
1967), according to which individuals aim to reduce potential
losses if they face uncertain outcomes (as with heterogeneous
services). We fortify our theoretical argument by showing that
negotiation aspirations increase more strongly for customized
services, which we attribute to the fact that customization
increases heterogeneity (Gwinner et al. 2005; Parasuraman
et al. 1988).
However, this effect via heterogeneity is offset by lower
negotiation aspirations owing to a service’s inseparability.
Both our theoretical analyses and our empirical evidence sug-
gest that customers fear damaging their relationship with a
service provider if they negotiate aggressively, potentially
resulting in lower service quality. We buttress this argument
by showing that negotiation aspirations increase less strongly,
or decrease more strongly, for high customer integration in a
service. We attribute this effect to integrated customers’ moti-
vation to preserve the relationship with a service provider
(e.g., Lax and Sebenius 1986) and to maintain a positive
self-image (e.g., Habel et al. 2017) (see H8).
Our finding that a service’s inseparability of production and
consumption leads customers to fear that negotiating lessens
service quality connects well with both prior negotiation liter-
ature and prior services literature. Negotiation literature has
long recognized the trade-off negotiators face between im-
proving their outcomes and preserving a good relationship
with their counterpart (e.g., Lax and Sebenius 1986).
Negotiators who highly value the relationship negotiate less
assertively (e.g., Amanatullah et al. 2008; Wieseke et al.
2014). In addition, services literature has emphasized that cus-
tomers infer service quality from the price they have to pay
(e.g., Grewal et al. 2000). Our study connects the two research
streams by illustrating that when it comes to services, a cus-
tomer’s price–quality inference and concern for the relation-
ship with a service provider may actually be two sides of the
same coin. We consider this association to be the most intrigu-
ing implication from our combination of the IHIP framework
and aspiration level theory.
The second contribution of this paper for academia lies in
its methodological implications for future negotiation re-
search. Our study illustrates that customers’ negotiation be-
havior is affected bywhether an offering is a good or a service,
specifically by characteristics such as heterogeneity, insepara-
bility, customization, and integration. Importantly, negotiation
literature has often neglected to consider these effects and
focused on either goods (e.g.,White and Neale 1994), services
(e.g., Adam and Shirako 2013), or a combination of the two
without distinction (e.g., Van Kleef et al. 2004), or has not
specified the type of the negotiated object (e.g., Moosmayer
et al. 2012). As services negotiations may differ from goods
negotiations, we recommend that to reduce omitted variable
bias, future negotiation studies control for the offering type.
Several studies have examined the effect of relationships
between negotiators on negotiation behavior (e.g.,
Amanatullah et al. 2008; Wieseke et al. 2014; Alavi et al.
2016), and possibly the effects uncovered by this literature
are particularly pronounced when negotiating about custom-
ized and integrated services, because in this context relation-
ships are of heightened importance. Examining such bound-
ary conditions of prior literature constitutes an interesting av-
enue for future research.
Third, our study conceptualizes and empirically verifies
four novel communication strategies that successfully reduce
customers’ aspirations when negotiating about services with
high heterogeneity and low integration—that is, services that
tend to arouse negotiation aspirations—thereby contributing
to literature on influence tactics in price negotiations (e.g.,
Malhotra and Bazerman 2008). Studies in this literature have
shown that customers’ negotiation behavior can easily be in-
fluenced through minor communicative changes, such as spe-
cifics of price anchors (e.g., Bhatia and Gunia 2018), the dis-
play of functional and relational customer orientation (e.g.,
Wieseke et al. 2014), or the priming of fairness (e.g.,
Maxwell et al. 1999). Our strategies are similar, as only small
changes in salespeople’s communication have significant ef-
fects on customers’ negotiation aspirations. We encourage
testing of these strategies in the field and across various nego-
tiation contexts.
Managerial implications
Managers have long complained that salespeople grant dis-
counts too easily (Joseph 2001; CSO Insights 2014). These
concerns have been fueled by the increasing servitization of
companies, which increases negotiations with customers
(Sharma and Krishnan 2001). To help managers avoid exces-
sive discounting of services, our study provides two sets of
recommendations.
Reduction of aspirations First, managers can present their ser-
vices in a way that reduces customers’ negotiation aspirations.
Two avenues seem particularly promising in this respect, re-
lating to heterogeneity and inseparability. Particularly if their
services are customized, managers may work toward reducing
customers’ perceived heterogeneity. As a result, customers
should perceive negotiating as less legitimate and be less in-
clined to reduce their risk by negotiating down the price. To
reduce perceived heterogeneity, managers may emphasize
their service’s quality and quality control on the level of
resources, processes, and outcomes (Donabedian 1966). On
a resource level, for example, managers can emphasize the
selection and training of their personnel (e.g., Zeithaml et al.
1985), as McKinsey does by stressing that it hires employees
who are “at the top of their fields” (McKinsey 2018). On a
process level, managers might industrialize services by
“substitut[ing] organized preplanned systems for individual
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service operations” (Zeithaml et al. 1985, p. 35). For example,
management consulting firms frequently develop and publish
standardized approaches for delivering customized advice to
their customers (O’Mahoney and Sturdy 2016). Moreover,
companies can emphasize how their use of automation tech-
nologies, including artificial intelligence, controls service
quality and thus secures value for customers (Huang and
Rust 2018; Singh et al. 2019). For example, financial service
providers might detect credit card fraud through artificial in-
telligence and thus reduce customers’ perceived risk (Yee
et al. 2018). Last, on an outcome level, managers might illus-
trate their consistently high service quality through reference
customers. For example, proposals of management consulting
firms typically contain an overview of reference projects that
illustrate how the firm has successfully solved similar chal-
lenges of other industry players.Managers can also stress their
services’ inseparability and the integration of customers in the
service process, leading customers to be more careful not to
harm the relationship through tough negotiations. For exam-
ple, the mission statement of the Boston Consulting Group
(BCG 2018) states, “We work with our clients to build the
capabilities that enable organizations to achieve sustainable
advantage. We are shaping the future. Together.”
Training in communication strategies Second, managers
should prepare their sales staff for customers’ increasing ne-
gotiation aspirations when selling services with high hetero-
geneity and low inseparability or integration. To this end,
managers can train their sales staff in the communication strat-
egies our study devised and empirically verified. The most
promising communication strategies for reducing customers’
negotiation aspirations are to simply state that prices are non-
negotiable (e.g., “As is common in our industry, we follow a
fixed price policy, so our prices are not negotiable”) or to
create price transparency that illustrates the fairness of the
requested price (e.g., “As you can see on this list, the price
for this product is a fair market price”). However, we acknowl-
edge that sales staff may hesitate to use these strategies be-
cause they may perceive them as confrontational or overly
focused on the issue of pricing instead of value (e.g.,
Hoffman 2018). Therefore, a viable alternative may be to
stress the importance of a good relationship with customers
(e.g., “It is important to me that we have very good relation-
ship. After all, we will interact very closely during the service
delivery”).
Limitations and avenues for future research
Two limitations of our manuscript that provide avenues for
future research are its focus on (1) sequential price negotia-
tions and (2) its use of steady states rather than companies’
servitization. As to the first, an interesting question is to what
extent our findings are generalizable from sequential
negotiations to other pricing contexts, such as price bidding
(e.g., Haruvy and Popkowski Leszczyc 2016). On the basis of
our findings, wewould expect services versus goods to exhibit
a pattern of effects on customers’ bids similar to that on cus-
tomers’ negotiation aspirations. However, we would expect
the heterogeneity path to outweigh the inseparability path be-
cause by initiating a bidding process a service provider spec-
ifies bidding as the “rule of the game,” which a customer
merely follows. Thus, compared to proactively initiating a
price negotiation, customers should be less concerned about
damaging the relationship through bidding. The second limi-
tation that future research could explore is our neglect of in-
creasing servitization over time. Our studies investigate steady
states in which customers negotiate about either goods or ser-
vices. An interesting question is whether and how the effects
uncovered by our studies emerge when a firm “servitizes” its
goods, as with Rolls Royce’s pivot from selling jet engines to
selling “power by the hour” (Singh et al. 2019). Specifically,
would customers instantly perceive increased heterogeneity
and inseparability with their countervailing effects on negoti-
ation aspiration? By delving into this question, future research
could provide guidance to firms switching from a goods-
centric to a service-centric approach.
Appendix
Table 5 Survey measurements
IHIP Dimensions:
Intangibility (Zeithaml, Parasuraman, and Berry 1985) / Studies 1, 2
Definition: Extent to which an offering cannot be seen, felt, tasted, or touched
α / AVE / CR:Study 1: .93 / .83 / .94; Study 2: .90 / .75 / .90
The offering that I negotiated about is …
• tangible / intangiblea,1,2
• material / immateriala,1,2
• physical / not physicala,1,2
Heterogeneity (Zeithaml, Parasuraman, and Berry 1985) / Studies 1, 2
Definition: Extent to which the performance of a service is variable
α / AVE / CR: Study 1: .70 / .62 / .79; Study 2: .91 / .78 / .91
The performance of the offering that I negotiated about …
• is the same for every customer / can vary from customer to customera,1,2
• is identical for every customer / is different for every customera,1,2
• strongly adapted to individual customersb,1
• is always the same / fluctuatesa,2
Inseparability (Zeithaml, Parasuraman, and Berry 1985) / Studies 1, 2
Definition: Extent to which an offering is produced and consumed
simultaneously
α / AVE / CR: Study 1: .91 / .74 / .90; Study 2: .76 / — / —
The offering that I negotiated about is …
• first produced and then consumed / produced and consumed
simultaneouslya,1,2
• consumed only after it is produced / consumed while it is being
produceda,1
• produced before I’m using it / produced while I’m using ita,1
• produced and consumed at different times / produced and consumed at the
same timea,2
Perishability (Zeithaml, Parasuraman, and Berry 1985) / Studies 1, 2
Definition:Extent to which an offering cannot be saved
α / AVE / CR:Study 1: .92 / .79 / .92; Study 2: .85 / .67 / .86
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